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I investigate whether the precision of an earnings forecast interacts with environmental 
uncertainty to affect investors’ perceptions of management credibility, future firm 
growth, and firm stock price.  I find that investors respond to a misalignment between 
environmental uncertainty and forecast precision by lowering their growth 
expectations and stock price estimates (lowering growth expectations and penalizing 
price estimates when point forecasts are issued in relatively uncertain environments or 
range forecasts are issued in relatively certain environments).  I find a similar pattern 
of results for investors’ perceptions of management credibility.   Perceptions of 
management credibility mediate the impact of misalignment on investors’ perceptions 
of future growth but do not mediate the impact of misalignment on stock price 
estimates.  My findings have implications for managers issuing forecasts and for 
investors interpreting forecasts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I investigate the impact of voluntary positive performance forecasts on 
investors’ judgments of management credibility, future firm growth, and firm stock 
price. Faced with investor skepticism, managers issuing positive earnings forecasts 
have a difficult task of credibly relaying information contained in these voluntary 
disclosures. Prior research has investigated how management choices regarding the 
characteristics of positive performance forecasts may improve investors’ assessments 
of management credibility. For example, Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2007) 
find that management’s choice to disaggregate positive earnings forecasts leads to 
increased perceptions of credibility, which in turn impact investors’ estimates of a 
firm’s price earnings multiple. Yet, little evidence exists that managements’ decision 
regarding another forecast characteristic, forecast precision, has a similar impact on 
investors’ immediate judgment (Hirst, Koonce, Miller 1999). I contribute to this area 
of accounting literature by introducing investors’ ex-ante expectations as a variable 
that determines the impact of forecast precision on investors’ judgments.  Specifically, 
I focus on the inferences that investors make prior to learning the realization of the 
forecast and predict lower management credibility perceptions, lower future growth 
expectations, and lower stock price estimates when the actual precision of the forecast 
does not align with investors’ expectations than when it does align. 
Although not mandatory, issuances of management earnings forecasts have 
been prominent in recent years.  Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006) document that 
31% of firms captured by the First Call database disclosed management forecasts in 
  
2
2001, versus the 11% of firms that issued them in 1995.1  Prior research also finds that 
management’s earnings forecasts are informative to the market, as analysts and 
investors rely on this information when making investment recommendations (Cotter, 
Tuna, Wysocki 2006) and investment decisions (e.g. Rogers and Stocken 2005). 
Libby, Tan, and Hunton (2006) (hereafter LTH) provide experimental evidence 
that forecast precision does not affect analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) estimates 
following disclosure of an earnings forecast, but does affect analysts’ EPS estimates 
following the actual earnings announcement.  LTH explain these results as driven by 
the combined knowledge of forecast precision and forecast error.  Since information 
about forecast error is only available following the actual earnings announcement, 
only at that time can analysts assess whether managements’ forecast precision was 
appropriate.  I predict that, when investors have ex-ante expectations about the amount 
of uncertainty within a firm’s forecasting environment, forecast precision can affect 
investors’ decisions even before the earnings announcement.   
In addition to testing the effects of forecast precision on growth expectations 
and stock price estimates, I investigate how investors reach these estimates.  Based on 
attribution theory (Gilbert and Malone 1995), I predict that when forecast precision 
does not align with expected environmental uncertainty, investors question that 
inconsistency and attribute its cause to management characteristics such as 
competence and trustworthiness.  Further, because management discloses positive 
news, initial investor skepticism leads to attributions that are negative, lowering 
perceptions of management credibility, which in turn impact investors’ expectations of 
future growth and stock price estimates.   
                                                 
1
 Further, of the 515 National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) members who responded to the annual 
forward-looking guidance practices survey, 60% indicated that they issued earnings guidance in 2009 
(www.NIRI.org). 
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To test my predictions, I implement a 2x2 between subjects factorial design in 
which I manipulate the precision of a positive news forecast (point forecast vs. range 
forecast) and investors’ expectations about the uncertainty present in the firm’s 
environment (high uncertainty vs. low uncertainty).  Participants make an initial stock 
price estimate, then view a management earnings forecast, and then reevaluate their 
initial stock price estimate.  Next they state how confident they feel about their final 
stock price estimate, answer questions about management credibility, and indicate 
their future growth expectations. I set my study within the context of a firm disclosing 
positive news because prior research has documented that positive news disclosures 
face particular credibility challenges (Williams 1996, Mercer 2005, Rogers and 
Stocken 2005).  Since disclosing favorable information is typically in line with self-
serving incentives, market participants are especially skeptical of these types of 
disclosures.  I manipulate expectations of environmental uncertainty by providing 
information about environmental uncertainty and the level of analyst consensus 
regarding earnings forecasts (uncertain environment with low analyst consensus vs. 
certain environment with high analyst consensus).   
Testing my predictions using an experiment provides several advantages for 
this study.  An experimental approach allows me to hold constant characteristics of the 
company and voluntary disclosure that might covary with forecast precision in 
practice.  Also, via experimental treatments, I can obtain an adequate sample size of 
combinations of forecast precision and environmental uncertainty that are 
underrepresented in practice but that shed light on the theoretical constructs I am 
investigating.  Finally, with an experiment I can elicit intervening variables (i.e., 
perceptions of management competence and trustworthiness) that allow me to test my 
process theory for the effect of forecast precision on growth expectations and stock 
price estimates. 
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My findings confirm that misalignment between forecast precision and 
investors’ expectations regarding environmental uncertainty decreases investors’ 
perceptions of management credibility, their growth expectations, and their stock price 
estimates. However, while perceptions of management credibility serve as a mediator 
between misalignment and growth expectations, they do not serve as a mediator 
between misalignment and stock price estimates. This result suggests that 
misalignment between environmental uncertainty and forecast precision leads 
investors to draw inferences regarding more than just management credibility when 
generating their stock price estimates.   
This research contributes to the current literature in several respects.  First, I 
identify one reason that may explain why prior behavioral studies have not 
documented an effect of forecast precision immediately following an earnings 
forecast.  Since prior studies were designed to focus on characteristics of the forecast 
and not investors’ expectations about forecast precision, prior research has not 
examined how the cues provided by forecast precision interact with pre-existing 
investors’ expectations.  I provide the first evidence that pre-existing expectations 
interact with forecast precision to affect growth expectations and stock price estimates.  
Second, by documenting an effect of forecast precision immediately after earnings 
guidance, I highlight the significance of this formatting choice to management and 
suggest that further investigation of the effects of forecast precision are warranted.  
For example, format expectations may also affect how forecast precision and forecast 
error interact following earnings announcements in addition to following earnings 
forecasts.  Third, I aid managers in more effectively anticipating concerns about 
management credibility by providing evidence about how a choice of forecast 
precision affects management credibility at different levels of environmental 
uncertainty.   
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, I discuss 
background literature and develop my hypotheses.  I describe my experimental design 
in Chapter 3.  I present results in Chapter 4 and conclude with Chapter 5.    
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Forecast Precision 
In a framework based on Ajinkya and Gift’s (1984) expectations adjustment 
hypothesis, King, Pownall, and Waymire (1990) propose that the value relevance of 
management forecasts is based on forecast timing, credibility, and form (or precision).  
Baginski and Hassell (1990) show that forecast timing is important when comparing 
fourth quarter versus non-fourth quarter forecasts, since fourth quarter disclosures are 
more closely followed by analysts. Prior research also finds that various characteristics 
of forecasts such as news valence (Williams 1996, Hutton, Miller, and Skinner 2003, 
Mercer 2005, Rogers and Stocken 2005), forecast disaggregation (Hirst, Koonce, and 
Venkataraman 2007), forecast accuracy (Williams 1996, Hirst, Koonce, and Miller 
1999) and supplementary forecast information (Hutton, Miller, and Skinner 2003, 
Barton and Mercer 2005) all impact investors’ behavior via their effect on perceptions 
of management credibility.   
Yet, few studies document an effect of forecast precision (e.g. point vs. range 
estimates) on reactions to earnings forecasts, and those that do, provide conflicting 
evidence.   Archivally, Baginski, Conrad, and Hassell (1993) and Baginski, Hassell, 
and Wieland (2007) find a significant relationship between returns and forecast 
precision immediately following guidance, but Pownall, Wasley, and Waymire (1993) 
and Atiase, Li, Supattarakul and Tse (2005) do not.  Experimentally, neither Hirst, 
Koonce, and Miller (1999) nor Libby, Tan, and Hunton (2006) find that forecast 
precision has an impact on investors’ own forecasts of firm performance following 
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forecast issuance.2  Han and Tan (2010) find a marginally significant effect of forecast 
precision immediately following forecast issuance, but only when investors have 
directional preferences in a positive news forecast setting.  That is, they find that 
participants assigned a long (short) position are more likely to provide a higher (lower) 
earnings estimate given a positive news range forecast than given a positive news 
point forecast.  Han and Tan explain that viewing a range forecast allows motivated 
reasoning (i.e. long/short investors’ preferences for good/poor performance) to affect 
investors’ judgments more freely (given greater uncertainty in future firm 
performance) than viewing a point forecast. However, this result is in disagreement 
with archival findings in Baginski et al. (2007) which suggest that more precise (e.g. 
point) forecasts rather than less precise (e.g. range) forecasts lead to greater price and 
analyst guidance revision.  Further, consistent with prior experimental studies, Han 
and Tan find no effect of forecast precision in control treatments in which participants 
have no directional preferences (as is the case in my study).  
Libby, Tan, and Hunton (2006) (hereafter LTH) suggest that the reason for the 
lack of prior findings regarding the impact of forecast precision stems from focusing 
on too narrow of a time frame.  LTH argue that the effect of forecast precision can 
only be fully understood following the actual earnings announcement, when analysts 
can interpret information inherent in the precision of the forecast along with the 
forecast error.  Their results indicate that, once an earnings forecast is realized, 
analysts’ own forecasts respond to the direction of forecast error differently depending 
on whether the forecast was a point estimate, a narrow range estimate, or a wide range 
estimate.  It appears that evaluating forecast form along with forecast error allows 
analysts to draw inferences about the level of uncertainty surrounding the forecast 
                                                 
2
 Both Hirst et al. (1999) and Libby et al. (2006), however, find that forecast precision affects investors’ 
confidence in their own forecasts immediately following guidance.   
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estimate (i.e., inferring more uncertainty when the forecast is a wide-range estimate 
and less when the forecast is a point estimate) and about how well management 
responded to that uncertainty (i.e., management over- or under-estimating actual 
earnings performance).   
However, what if investors already have pre-established expectations regarding 
the amount of uncertainty within the environment, and those expectations do not align 
with management beliefs?  Most firms do not follow a set policy regarding the 
precision of forecast they issue (Bamber and Cheon 1998; Hirst, Koonce, and Miller 
1999), suggesting that forecast precision could vary with environmental factors and be 
seen as a signal of precision of management information.  
The consensus, or lack thereof, among analysts may be one salient cue 
regarding the amount of uncertainty surrounding information about firm performance. 
Consistent with descriptive statistics in Baginski, Conrad, and Hassell (1993), an 
untabulated analysis of the frequency of Point and Range earnings forecasts given 
high and low analyst consensus for forecasts issued between 1994 and 2006 suggests 
that all four combinations of Point/Range forecast and Low/High environmental 
uncertainty occur in the market.3 Investors’ expectations do not always align with 
management perceptions of environmental uncertainty.4  
Given the existence of settings in which firms disclose earnings forecasts with 
precision that does and does not align with investors’ expectations, I turn to 
expectations-related psychology literature to consider the effects of misalignment on 
                                                 
3
 Point and Range estimates constitute a significant portion of earnings forecasts issued.  Between 1994 
and 2006 approximately 20% (65%) of all forecasts issued were point (range) estimates.  Remaining 
forecasts take the form of minimum, maximum, or qualitative predictions (Source: First Call Company 
Issue Guidelines). 
4
 In this study I use analyst consensus as an example of a cue regarding a firm’s environmental 
uncertainty.  However, investors may also look to various other environmental uncertainty cues, for 
example, industry membership (Hrebiniak and Snow 1980) or stage in the firm’s life cycle (Mueller 
1972).  
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investors’ judgments. 
 
Attribution Theory and Management Credibility 
Attribution theory suggests that unexpected forecast precision can affect 
market reactions to an earnings forecast, particularly through its impact on perceptions 
of management credibility.  Attribution theory concerns inferences people make in 
order to discern what causes various observed behaviors (Fiske and Taylor 1991).  It 
posits that decision makers tend to possess ex ante expectations about an observed 
behavior, and that when reality does not align with expectations, observers are prone 
to attribute the behavior to internal rather than external characteristics (Gilbert and 
Malone 1995).  Therefore, when forecast precision and environmental uncertainty 
expectations do not align, rather than assume the misalignment was caused by one of 
various external factors, investors are more likely to question management credibility.  
Further, in cases where investors are already skeptical of management motivation for 
disclosing an earnings forecast, such as when management discloses positive news 
forecasts, attributions to management credibility are likely to be negative.  As a result, 
attribution theory suggests that, given a positive news forecast, perceptions of 
management credibility will be significantly lower when environmental uncertainty 
and forecast precision do not align than when they align.5 
                                                 
5
 Most prior accounting studies that take investor expectations into account do not investigate whether 
or not expectations align with what the market observes in reality.  Clor-Proell (2009) is one exception.  
She manipulates investor expectations about how a firm will report stock option compensation by 
varying whether other firms in the industry recognize stock option expense in the financial statements 
or only disclose stock option expense in the footnotes.  She shows that, when a firm chooses a format 
that does not align with investor expectations but is  more/less preferred by the market (as is the case 
with recognition/disclosure of stock option expense), investor reactions are more extreme (in both 
positive and negative signal cases) than when a firm chooses a format that aligns with investor 
expectations.  Whereas Clor-Proell investigated effects of disclosure location (recognized vs. 
disclosed), I investigate effect of forecast precision (point vs. range).  Further, it is not clear that 
disclosing a less precise (range) estimate instead of a more precise (point) estimate is perceived as a 
strong negative signal akin to disclosing stock option compensation in the footnotes.  Psychology 
studies provide evidence that decision makers generally prefer more precise (numeric) information 
(Kuhn and Budescu 1996; Kuhn, Budescu, Hershey, Kramer, and Rantilla 1999), but other research 
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H1:  Perceptions of management credibility are lower when expectations 
about environmental uncertainty and precision of positive news forecasts 
do not align than when they align. 
 
Signaling as an Alternative Hypothesis 
Signaling theory concerns why, given an asymmetric information environment, 
certain types of communication are considered more reliable than others.  It suggests 
that a manager’s signal is viewed as more reliable if the cost of falsely issuing that 
signal is higher than the benefit (Spence 1974).  Because the market punishes firms 
that do not meet their earnings forecasts with lower stock prices, and missing a point 
forecast is more likely than missing a range forecast, issuing a positive point forecast 
in a highly uncertain environment could be perceived as a more reliable signal of 
positive private information.   
Thus, contrary to attribution theory, signaling theory would predict that 
participants will assign high management credibility ratings in the misalignment 
scenario where a point forecast is issued given a highly uncertain environment. 
Therefore, for H1 to hold in the Point Forecast/High Uncertainty setting, the negative 
attribution associated with misalignment must exceed any positive signal that 
investors perceive.   
In the study, I address the potential presence of signaling expectations in two 
ways: by using a design in which signaling cannot explain my predicted pattern of 
results, and by debriefing questions that elicit investors’ considerations that 
management may possess positive private information. 
                                                                                                                                            
suggests that preference for more precise vs. less precise information may depend on the type of event 
being predicted (Zimmer 1983, Wallsten, Budescu, Zwick, and Kemp 1993, Windschitl and Wells 
1996, and Olson and Budescu 1997). In some circumstances receiving information that is too precise 
may be perceived just as negatively as receiving information that is not precise enough. My experiment 
allows me to investigate both of these cases.  
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Firm Valuation 
Perceptions of management credibility have been linked to various 
economically significant investor and analyst behaviors.  For example, studies have 
shown that perceptions of management credibility affect investors’ willingness to rely 
on subsequent management disclosures (Mercer 2005), estimates of firm price-
earnings (P/E) multiples (Barton and Mercer 2005; Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman 
2007), and investment decisions (Clor-Proell 2009). The main measure of investor and 
analyst behavior in forecast precision studies, however, has been an EPS estimate.  To 
link these two streams of literature I investigate the effect of credibility on both a P/E 
multiple related measure (i.e. growth) and on stock price estimates, which incorporate 
information from the P/E multiple measure used in credibility studies and the EPS 
measure used in forecast precision studies.   I depict these relationships with a causal 
model in Figure 1 and refer to each link of the model as I describe H2 and H3. Note 
that the already discussed H1 is depicted with Link 1 in the model and identifies the 
relationship between misalignment (of environmental uncertainty and forecast 
precision) and investor perceptions of management credibility.  
  Prior research has already established a relationship between perceptions of 
management credibility and growth-related measures presented via Link 2 in Figure 1 
(Barton and Mercer 2005, Hirst, Koonce, Venkataraman 2007).  I therefore predict 
that misalignment will have a similar effect on growth as it does on management 
credibility (Figure 1: Link 3): 
H2: Perceptions of future growth are lower when expectations about 
environmental uncertainty and precision of positive news forecasts do 
not align than when they align. 
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FIGURE 1: H1-H3 Causal Model 
 
Figure 1 presents a causal model that depicts the relationships among the first three hypotheses (i.e. H1-H3).  
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Since growth perceptions are a component of stock price estimates (Figure 1: 
Link 4), I predict that stock price estimates will also follow the same pattern as do 
perceptions of management credibility, being less favorable when environmental 
uncertainty and forecast precision do not align than when they align (Figure 1: Link 
5). 
H3: Stock price estimates are lower when expectations about environmental 
uncertainty and precision of positive news forecasts do not align than 
when they align. 
Implied in H1 through H3, and shown in Figure 1, is a process by which 
perceptions of management credibility serve as a mediator between misalignment and 
growth expectations and as a mediator between misalignment and stock price 
estimates.  Further, growth expectations serve as a mediator between misalignment 
and stock price estimates.  I test each of these mediation paths in addition to my 
hypotheses. 
Note that Environmental Uncertainty has the potential to affect growth – a 
major component of the P/E multiple estimate – independent of the predicted 
misalignment effect.  Specifically, the environmental uncertainty a firm faces may 
serve as a clue toward its future growth possibilities.  For example, many startup 
companies with a high potential for growth also face high uncertainty in their 
operating environments (Zhang 2006, Jiang, Lee, Zhang 2005).  This link between 
growth and uncertainty would suggest that investors’ perceptions of growth may be 
higher given a high uncertainty environment than given a low uncertainty 
environment.  A potential main effect of uncertainty, however, does not preclude the 
effect of misalignment between forecast precision and environmental uncertainty on 
investors’ perceptions of growth or on their stock price estimates. 
 14 
Confidence in Firm Valuation 
Prior research indicates that forecast precision increases investors’ confidence 
in their estimates of future firm performance (Hirst et al. 1999; LTH).  I predict that 
expectations about environmental uncertainty also will affect investors’ confidence in 
valuation estimates.  Since an expectation of high environmental uncertainty suggests 
difficulty in estimating future stock price, an investor who expects high uncertainty 
and views a range forecast should be least confident about his valuation estimate.  On 
the other hand, since an expectation of low environmental uncertainty suggests ease in 
estimating future stock price, an investor who expects low environmental uncertainty 
and views a point forecast should be most confident about his valuation estimate. 
H4: Investors’ confidence in their stock price estimates is highest (lowest) in 
response to point (range) earnings forecasts evaluated with an 
expectation of low (high) environmental uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERMIENT6 
 
Design 
I use a 2x2 between subjects design in which I manipulate forecast precision 
(point vs. range) and the level of uncertainty in the environment (low vs. high).7  The 
Low Uncertainty/Range Forecast and High Uncertainty/Point Forecast treatments 
represent environments of misalignment between market expectations and actual 
forecast precision.  This design is pictured in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2: Experimental Design 
 
 Participants 
990 alumni from a major northeastern university with finance-oriented careers 
are contacted via e-mail to participate in the online study.  140 alumni (24% female) 
                                                 
6
 Details of a pilot experiment are included in the Appendix. 
7
 Theoretically, because support for my hypotheses depends on participants understanding that earnings 
forecasts occur at various precision levels and firms operate in different uncertainty environments, 
either or both of my independent variables could have been presented within subjects.  However, pilot 
testing suggested that asking participants to provide estimates for two different scenarios (e.g. point vs. 
range) established the first estimate as a benchmark which participants then use as information in 
determining their second estimate.  Therefore, to assure that only precision and uncertainty had an 
effect on participant responses, I manipulate each variable between participants. 
 Low Uncertainty High Uncertainty 
Precise (Point) Forecast (1) 
Benchmark 
(2) 
Misalignment 
Imprecise (Range) 
Forecast 
(3) 
Misalignment 
(4) 
Benchmark 
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complete the study, yielding a response rate of 14%.8  Due to an initial software 
problem and several participants providing EPS rather than stock price estimates, 20 
responses are excluded from analysis, for a total of 120 useable responses.  The 
average participant age is 44.  Participants have completed an average of 3 accounting 
and 4 finance courses, and have average working experience of 21 years, so they 
possess the base level of investor knowledge necessary for my experimental task.9 
 
Procedure 
All participants receive an e-mail inviting them to participate in an accounting 
research study which they can access on-line via a provided link.  In return for 
participation, all participants are entered into a raffle for a new iPod touch or Nintendo 
Wii system and provided the option to receive a summary of the study’s results 
following data collection and analysis. The on-line materials are designed using 
Qualtrics software which randomly assigns each participant to one treatment of my 
design and prevents participants from changing their responses throughout the 
duration of the study once each answer has been submitted.10 
                                                 
8
 This response rate is comparable to the response rates of other research using samples of finance and 
accounting professionals, e.g. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal’s (2005) response rate of 10.4% and Clor-
Proell and Maines’ (2009) response rate of 13%. 
9
 To further assess experience with estimating firm stock price, I also ask participants to specify 
whether or not they possess any stock price estimate experience and if so, whether that experience 
comes from personal investments, professional training, or both.  Participant answers to this question 
are included as a covariate when testing each hypothesis in order to further reduce potential noise in 
dependent variable responses. 
10
 Once each participant accesses the survey, signs a consent form, and views initial study information 
that remains constant across all four treatments, Qualtrics randomly displays materials relevant to one 
of the four treatments of my design using the Mersenne Twister (MT) random number generator.  Four 
different sets of such materials have been preprogrammed into Qualtrics, each relating to a different cell 
of my design, allowing the software to randomly select one set of materials per participant.  This 
randomization procedure has one constraint – that each treatment be displayed no more than 30 times 
(for a total of 120 observations).  Active monitoring of the data collection process suggests that 
Qualtrics correctly performed the randomization procedure. 
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After signing a consent form and reading general instructions, all participants 
view a brief description of the target firm, Zetha Inc.11 To assure that all participants 
have equivalent beliefs about management’s tendency to undershoot actual earnings in 
its forecasts, I include the following statement: “Firms that issue earnings forecasts 
within the electronic industry receive higher valuations when they are able to meet or 
beat their own forecasts than when they fail to achieve their own forecasts.”  
Following the review of background information, all participants answer a 
comprehension check question to determine if they understand that Zetha Inc.’s 
management aims to meet or beat its earnings forecasts.  Next, all participants view 
Zetha’s income statement for the previous three years, Zetha’s stock price for the year 
ending 2009, and the mean and median analyst earnings forecast as of September 30th, 
2010.  After reviewing this information, participants are asked to provide an initial 
estimate of stock price per share for Zetha Inc. as of December 31st, 2010. 
Participants in the Low (High) Uncertainty treatments are then informed that 
the firm operates in a highly certain (uncertain) environment.  The low (high) level of 
environmental uncertainty is first stated (i.e. “Overall, Zetha Inc. operates in a highly 
certain (uncertain) environment.”) and then supported by the following statement 
regarding analysts’ consensus: “There is strong agreement (disagreement) among 
analysts in their EPS forecasts.” All participants are also reminded that the most recent 
mean and median analyst EPS forecast is $0.60.   
Next, all participants receive a management earnings forecast, where some 
view a point forecast and others view a range forecast: 
On October 1, 2010, Zetha’s management issued the following statement: 
 
The company expects earnings per share for the year ending December 
31, 2010 to be above expectations due to stronger than expected sales.  
                                                 
11
 Background firm information is adapted from Libby, Tan, and Hunton (2006).  
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Earnings per share are estimated to be approximately $0.69 [in the 
range of $0.64 to $0.74] for the year. 
 
Following the earnings forecast, I ask two more comprehension questions to 
assess whether participants understood the level of uncertainty and forecast form 
presented to them.  The two questions ask that participants select which levels of 
environmental uncertainty (Highly Certain or Highly Uncertain) and forecast precision 
(Point vs. Range) apply to Zetha Inc.  Each incorrect response is followed by a 
reiteration of the correct information.  Next, all participants once again estimate the 
firm’s stock price per share as of December 31st, 2010, specify how confident they are 
in this estimate, and evaluate management trustworthiness and competence.  Before 
answering demographic questions, participants are also asked how much they believe 
Zetha’s earnings will grow in the future, and whether or not they considered that 
management may possess positive private information or the potential for earnings 
management prior to making their stock price estimates.  If participants answer ‘Yes’ 
to either of the private information or earnings management questions, they are also 
asked to indicate how important that information was to their stock price estimate (i.e. 
Not very important, Somewhat important, Very important). Finally, all participants 
answer several demographic questions. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Participants respond to four questions that serve as my dependent variables: a 
stock price estimate (the only variable elicited before and after study manipulations), a 
measure of confidence in the stock price estimate, a management credibility scale, and 
a future earnings growth expectation.  For the stock price estimate, participants are 
asked to provide a prediction for the year ended December 31st, 2010.  Next, all 
participants rate how confident they are that their price per share estimates are 
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accurate using an 11-point scale that varies (in intervals of 10) from 0 (Not at all 
confident) to 100 (Certain)12.  The management credibility scale consists of 2 
questions which ask whether management is competent and trustworthy13; each 
question varies with the precision and uncertainty treatment as follows: 1) “Given 
Zetha’s highly certain [uncertain] operating environment and management’s point 
[range] earnings forecast, I trust Zetha’s management,” 2) “Given Zetha’s highly 
certain [uncertain] operating environment and management’s point [range] earnings 
forecast, Zetha's management is competent”.  Participants respond on a 7 point Likert 
scale with endpoints 1 (Strongly Disagree) and 7 (Strongly Agree) and midpoint 4 
(Neutral).  For the future earnings growth expectation, participants are asked to 
respond on a Likert scale with endpoints 1 (Zero Growth) and 7 (High Growth) and 
midpoint 4 (Moderate Growth). 
                                                 
12
 The wording for the confidence DV and its scale is adapted from Hirst, Koonce, and Miller (1999) 
and Libby, Tan, and Hunton (2006). 
13
 The management credibility scale is consistent with questions asked in prior accounting credibility 
studies (e.g. Mercer 2005; Barton and Mercer 2005; Hirst, Koonce, Venkataraman 2007) all of which 
rely on a widely accepted and validated  source credibility scale (McCroskey 1966; Leathers 1992; 
Newell and Goldsmith 2001) 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
Comprehension Checks 
Comprehension check questions appeared before participants responded to the 
post-manipulation dependent variables.  Each incorrect response was followed by a 
reiteration of the correct information, so I include all participants in my analyses. A 
total of 10 participants (8%) missed at least one comprehension check.14,15   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics (i.e., means, standard deviations, and medians) for each 
dependent variable are provided in Tables 1-3.  In order to reduce response noise and 
address differences in participant experience levels in estimating firm stock price, I 
include an ExperienceType covariate in the test of each hypothesis (ExperienceType = 
None, Personal, Professional, Both Personal and Professional).  Given the 
ExperienceType covariate and the categorical nature of my two independent variables, 
I use analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to test H1 through H4.   
 While equality of variances is satisfied across treatments (Levene’s test p-
values ≥ 0.272), the Anderson-Darling test of normality rejects (at p ≥ 0.076) the null 
that responses to each of my dependent variables are normally distributed.  However,  
                                                 
14
 These participants are distributed as follows across experimental treatments: three are from the low 
uncertainty/point condition; four are from the low uncertainty/range condition, and three are from the 
high uncertainty/point condition.  All participants from the high uncertainty/range condition answered 
all three comprehension check questions correctly. 
15
 Excluding participants who missed at least one comprehension check question does not affect the 
significance of the test of H4, marginally reduces the significance of tests of H1 and H3 but does not 
affect the qualitative interpretation of the data, and leads to a non significant result for H2.  Specifically, 
the significance of the test of H1 reduces from a p-value of 0.018 to a p-value of 0.067; the significance 
of the test of H2 reduces from a p-value of 0.095 to a p-value of 0.227; the significance of the test of H3 
reduces from a p-value of 0.046 to a p-value of 0.067. 
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TABLE 1: Credibility Descriptive Statistics 
 
PANEL A: Average Credibility Rating Descriptive Statistics – Mean, (Standard 
Deviation), [Median] 
 
  
  Environmental Uncertainty   
  
  Low High Overall   
Pr
ec
isi
o
n
 
Point 4.98  (1.00) [5.00] 
4.08  
(0.83) [4.00] 
4.53  
(1.02) [4.50] 
  
Range 4.43  (1.09) [4.00] 
4.40  
(0.80) [4.00] 
4.42  
(0.95) [4.00] 
  
Overall 4.71  (1.08) [5.00] 
4.24  
(0.83) [4.00]  
  
  
  
 
PANEL B: Competence Rating Descriptive Statistics – Mean, (Standard 
Deviation), [Median] 
 
  
  Environmental Uncertainty   
  
  Low High Overall   
Pr
ec
isi
o
n
 
Point 4.90  (1.19) [5.00] 
4.07  
(0.83) [4.00] 
4.48  
(1.10) [4.00]   
Range 4.40  (1.07) [4.00] 
4.40  
(1.00) [4.00] 
4.40  
(1.03) [4.00] 
  
Overall 4.65  (1.15) [4.50] 
4.24  
(0.93) [4.00]  
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TABLE 1: (Continued) 
 
PANEL C: Trustworthiness Rating Descriptive Statistics – Mean, (Standard 
Deviation), [Median] 
 
  
  Environmental Uncertainty   
  
  Low High Overall   
Pr
ec
isi
o
n
 
Point 5.07  (1.05) [5.00] 
4.10  
(1.03) [4.00] 
4.59  
(1.14) [4.00] 
  
Range 4.47  (1.22) [4.00] 
4.40  
(0.81) [4.00] 
4.44  
(1.03) [4.00]   
Overall 4.77  (1.17) [5.00] 
4.25  
(0.93) [4.00]  
  
  
  
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation), and [Median] – 
for the average of management competence and trustworthiness (Panel A), investors’ 
ratings of management competence (Panel B), and investors’ ratings of management 
trustworthiness (Panel C). The shaded areas represent the two conditions where 
Environmental Uncertainty and Forecast Precision do not align (i.e. Low 
Environmental Uncertainty/Range Forecast, High Environmental Uncertainty/Point 
Forecast).  
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TABLE 2: Growth Descriptive Statistics  
 
Mean, (Standard Deviation), [Median] 
 
  
  Environmental Uncertainty   
  
  Low High Overall   
Pr
ec
isi
o
n
 
Point 4.07  (0.91) [4.00] 
3.77 
(0.94) [4.00] 
3.92 
(0.93) [4.00] 
  
Range 3.70 (0.92) [4.00] 
4.00  
(0.91) [4.00] 
3.85  
(0.92) [4.00]   
Overall 3.88  (0.92) [4.00] 
3.88  
(0.92) [4.00]  
  
  
  
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation), and [Median] – 
for investors’ expectations of future firm growth. The shaded areas represent the two 
conditions where Environmental Uncertainty and Forecast Precision do not align (i.e. 
Low Environmental Uncertainty/Range Forecast, High Environmental 
Uncertainty/Point Forecast).  
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TABLE 3: Stock Price Descriptive Statistics 
 
PANEL A: Price Difference (= Post Treatment Price Estimate – Pre Treatment 
Price Estimate) Descriptive Statistics – Mean, (Standard Deviation), [Median] 
 
  
  Environmental Uncertainty   
  
  Low High Overall   
Pr
ec
isi
o
n
 
Point 0.93  (0.51) [0.90] 
0.58  
(0.39) [0.68] 
0.76  
(0.48) [0.90] 
  
Range 0.72  (0.54) [0.75] 
0.69  
(0.48) [0.80] 
0.71  
(0.50) [0.80] 
  
Overall 0.83  (0.53) [0.90] 
0.64  
(0.44) [0.78]  
  
  
  
 
 
PANEL B: Post Treatment Price Estimate Descriptive Statistics – Mean, 
(Standard Deviation), [Median] 
 
  
  Environmental Uncertainty   
  
  Low High Overall   
Pr
ec
isi
o
n
 
Point 6.97  (0.76) [6.90] 
6.50  
(0.46) [6.50] 
6.73  
(0.67) [6.90] 
  
Range 6.73  (0.69) [6.40] 
6.66  
(0.52) [6.80] 
6.69  
(0.61) [6.78] 
  
Overall 6.85  (0.73) [6.90] 
6.58  
(0.49) [6.78]  
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TABLE 3: (Continued) 
 
PANEL C: Confidence Rating Descriptive Statistics – Mean, (Standard 
Deviation), [Median] 
 
  
  Environmental Uncertainty 
  
  Low High Overall 
Pr
ec
isi
o
n
 
Point 59.67% (12.05%)[60.00%] 
43.33%  
(11.06%)[50.00%] 
51.50% 
(12.91%)[50.00%] 
Range 62.67% (10.16%)[70.00%] 
40.67% 
(15.99%)[50.00%] 
51.67% 
(15.59%)[55.00%] 
Overall 61.17% (11.00%)[70.00%] 
42.00% 
(13.49%)[50.00%]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation), and [Median] – 
for the difference in investors’ stock price estimates: post manipulation price estimate 
- pre manipulation price estimate (Panel A), post manipulation stock price estimates 
(Panel B), and investors’ confidence ratings for their post manipulation price estimates 
(Panel C).  The shaded areas represent the two conditions where Environmental 
Uncertainty and Forecast Precision do not align (i.e. Low Environmental 
Uncertainty/Range Forecast, High Environmental Uncertainty/Point Forecast).  
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given my large sample size (n=120), the central limit theorem ensures that parametric 
tests are robust to deviation from Gaussian distributions (Scheffé 1959).  Therefore, 
since parametric tests are more powerful than non-parametric analyses, I utilize 
parametric tests to analyze my data.16   
When describing simple main effects, I focus on simple effects within each 
environmental uncertainty level rather than within each precision level.  Since 
management has little control over the level of environmental uncertainty in which a 
firm operates, at least over the time horizon in which management must choose a level 
of forecast precision, analyzing simple effects within levels of environmental 
uncertainly is more informative about the potential effects of managements’ 
alternative disclosure choices.   
 
Effects of Misalignment - Credibility 
H1 predicts that ratings of management credibility will be lower in cases where 
investors’ expectations of environmental uncertainty and the precision of a 
management forecast do not align (i.e. High Uncertainty/Point Forecast and Low 
Uncertainty/Range Forecast) than when they align.   
To test H1, I first assess whether responses to the Trustworthiness and 
Competence questions represent the same underlying credibility construct by 
performing a reliability analysis.  The resulting Cronbach’s alpha is 0.81, well above 
the recommended threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978).  Therefore, I combine the 
management trustworthiness and competence estimates into one credibility measure 
by averaging the two responses.17 Next, I run an ANCOVA with Credibility as the 
                                                 
16
 Performing non-parametric tests for the Credibility (H1), Growth (H2), Stock Price (H3), and 
Confidence (H4) hypotheses leads to similar inferences: H1 p=0.018, H2 p=0.107, H3 p=0.039, H4 
p≤0.001. 
17
 Results are not affected if I replace the credibility measure with either the trustworthiness or 
competence measures. 
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dependent variable and ExperienceType as a covariate.  The mean Credibility 
responses for each cell of the 2x2 design are provided in Panel A of Table 4.  
ANCOVA results in Panel B of Table 4 show a significant Uncertainty x Precision 
interaction (p=0.018)18, supporting H1.   
As the focus of my analysis is on how forecast precision impacts investors’ 
judgments given ex-ante expectations induced by environmental uncertainty, I analyze 
simple effects within each environmental uncertainty setting (i.e. Low Uncertainty: 
point vs. range; High Uncertainty: point vs. range) while maintaining ExperienceType 
as a covariate.  Simple effects tests presented in Panel C of Table 4 show that, as 
predicted, credibility responses in both uncertainty scenarios are different from one 
another. In the Low Uncertainty setting, credibility assessments are significantly 
higher when a point forecast is issued than when a range forecast is issued (one-sided 
p=0.026), while, in the High Uncertainty setting, credibility assessments are 
marginally significantly higher when a range forecast is issued than when a point 
forecast is issued (one-sided p=0.075).19   
 
Effects of Misalignment - Growth 
H2 predicts lower future firm growth expectations in cases where investors’ 
expectations of environmental uncertainty and the precision of management forecast 
do not align.  To test H2, I run an ANCOVA with Growth as the dependent variable 
and ExperienceType as a covariate. The mean Growth expectations for each cell of the  
                                                 
18
 Excluding the ExperienceType covariate from the model does not affect inferences and leads to a 
significant Uncertainty*Precision interaction (p=0.012). 
19
 Simple effects may also be analyzed within each forecast precision setting.  Within the Point Forecast 
setting, Credibility perceptions in the Low Uncertainty treatment are significantly higher than 
Credibility perceptions in the High Uncertainty treatment (one-sided p<0.001); within the Range 
Forecast setting, Credibility perceptions in the High Uncertainty treatment are not significantly higher 
than Credibility perceptions in the Low Uncertainty treatment (one-sided p=0.412).   
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TABLE 4: Test of H1 
        
PANEL A: Mean Credibility Perceptions 
        
 
 
Environmental Uncertainty   
 Low  High Overall   
 
Fo
re
ca
st
 
Pr
ec
isi
o
n
 
Point 4.98 4.08 4.53 
  
 
Range 4.43 4.40 4.42 
  
 
 4.71 4.24 
 
  
        
PANEL B: Analysis of Covariance for Credibility given ExperienceType  
        
Source  DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
ExperienceType 1 2.008 0.773 0.773 0.88 0.351 
Uncertainty 1 5.990 6.120 6.120 6.93 0.010 
Precision  1 0.292 0.317 0.317 0.36 0.550 
Uncertainty*Precision 1 5.058 5.058 5.058 5.73 0.018 
Error  115 101.577 101.577 0.883   
Total  119 114.925     
 
PANEL C: Simple Main Effects given ExperienceType 
 
Low Uncertainty treatments: Point > Range p-value = 0.026 
 
High Uncertainty treatments: Range > Point p-value = 0.075 
 
 
Panel A of Table 4 presents mean Credibility perceptions – Credibility is obtained by 
averaging participant Trustworthiness and Competence ratings.  Panel B presents the 
results of an ANCOVA with Credibility as the dependent variable, Environmental 
Uncertainty, Forecast Precision, and their interaction as independent variables, and 
ExperienceType as a covariate (where ExperienceType = none, personal, professional, 
or both). Panel C presents the results of Simple Main Effects of Precision on 
Credibility given each Environmental Uncertainty scenario. 
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TABLE 5: Test of H2 
 
PANEL A: Mean Growth Expectations 
 
  
  Environmental Uncertainty 
  
  Low High Overall 
Pr
ec
isi
o
n
 
Point 4.07 3.77 3.92 
Range 3.70 4.00 3.85 
Overall 3.88 3.88  
 
    PANEL B: Analysis of Covariance for Growth given ExperienceType 
  
        
Source  DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
ExperienceType 1 0.871 0.511 0.511 0.61 0.438 
Uncertainty 1 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.00 0.948 
Precision  1 0.083 0.093 0.093 0.11 0.741 
Uncertainty*Precision  1 2.385 2.385 2.385 2.83 0.095 
Error  115 97.022 97.022 0.844   
Total             119  100.367         
 
PANEL C: Simple Main Effects given ExperienceType 
 
Low Uncertainty treatments: Point > Range p-value = 0.085 
          
High Uncertainty treatments: Range > Point p-value = 0.172 
 
 
Panel A of Table 5 presents mean Growth expectations.  Panel B presents the results 
of an ANCOVA with Growth as the dependent variable, Environmental Uncertainty, 
Forecast Precision, and their interaction as independent variables, and ExperienceType 
as a covariate (where ExperienceType = none, personal, professional, or both).  Panel 
C presents the results of Simple Main Effects of Precision on Growth given each 
Environmental Uncertainty scenario.  
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2x2 design are provided in Panel A of Table 5.  ANCOVA results in Panel B of Table 
5 show a marginally significant Uncertainty x Precision interaction (p=0.095), 
supporting H2.20   
I again focus on simple main effects for precision within each environmental 
uncertainty setting while maintaining ExperienceType as a covariate.  Simple effects 
tests in Panel C of Table 5 show that growth expectations are marginally significantly 
higher when a point forecast is issued than when a range forecast is issued (one-sided 
p=0.085) in the Low Uncertainty setting, but do not significantly differ between point 
and range scenarios in the High Uncertainty setting (one-sided p=0.172).21  
 
Effects of Misalignment - Stock Price Estimates 
H3 predicts that investors’ stock price estimates will be lower in the 
misalignment scenarios than in the alignment scenarios.  To test H3, I first determine 
the difference in stock price estimates for each participant by subtracting the pre-
manipulation stock price estimates from the post-manipulation stock price estimates. 
Next, I run an ANCOVA with PriceDifference as the dependent variable and 
ExperienceType as a covariate.  The mean PriceDifference estimates for each cell of 
the 2x2 design are provided in Panel A of Table 6.  ANCOVA results in Panel B of 
Table 6 show a significant Uncertainty x Precision interaction (p=0.039), supporting 
H3.22,23  
                                                 
20
 Excluding the ExperienceType covariate from the model does not affect inferences and leads to a 
marginally significant Uncertainty*Precision interaction (p=0.076). 
21
 Simple effects may also be analyzed within each forecast precision setting.  Within the Point Forecast 
setting, Growth expectations in the Low Uncertainty treatment are marginally significantly higher than 
Growth expectations in the High Uncertainty treatment (one-sided p-value=0.08); within the Range 
Forecast setting, Growth expectations in the High Uncertainty treatment are not significantly greater 
than Growth expectations in the Low Uncertainty treatment (one-sided p-value =0.112).   
22
 Excluding the ExperienceType covariate from the model does not affect inferences and leads to a 
marginally significant Uncertainty*Precision interaction (p=0.079). 
23
 Performing the same ANCOVA analysis with PostTreatmentPrice instead of PriceDifference as the 
dependent variable leads to similar results (p=0.053). 
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                                                    TABLE 6: Test of H3 
 
PANEL A: Mean PriceDifference Estimates 
        
 
 
Environmental Uncertainty   
 Low  High Overall   
 
Fo
re
ca
st
 
Pr
ec
isi
o
n
 
Point 0.93 0.58 0.76 
  
 
Range 0.72 0.69 0.71 
  
 
Overall 0.83 0.64  
  
        
PANEL B: Analysis of Covariance for PriceDifference given ExperienceType 
 
Source  DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
ExperienceType 
Uncertainty 
1 
1 
0.820 
1.280 
1.282 
1.307 
1.282 
1.307 
5.74 
5.86 
0.018 
0.017 
Precision  1 0.110 0.116 0.116 0.52 0.472 
Uncertainty*Precision 1 0.973 0.973 0.973 4.36 0.039 
Error  115 25.665 25.665 0.223   
Total  119 28.847     
 
PANEL C: Simple Main Effects given ExperienceType 
 
Low Uncertainty treatments: Point > Range p-value = 0.043 
 
High Uncertainty treatments: Range > Point p-value =0.140 
 
 
 
 
Panel A of Table 6 presents mean Price Difference estimates (where Price Difference 
= Post Manipulation Price Estimate – Pre Manipulation Price Estimate).  Panel B 
presents the results of an ANCOVA with PriceDifference as the dependent variable, 
Environmental Uncertainty, Forecast Precision, and their interaction as independent 
variables, and ExperienceType as a covariate (where ExperienceType = none, 
personal, professional, or both).  Panel C presents the results of Simple Main Effects 
of Precision on PriceDifference given each Environmental Uncertainty scenario. 
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I again focus on simple main effects for precision within each environmental 
uncertainty setting, while maintaining ExperienceType as a covariate.  As shown in 
Panel C of Table 6, regressing PriceDifference on Precision and ExperienceType in 
the Low Uncertainty treatments indicates that issuing a point forecast leads to 
significantly greater price estimates than issuing a range forecast (one-sided p=0.043) 
when uncertainty is low.  However, following the same procedure in the High 
Uncertainty treatments suggests that issuing a range forecast does not lead to 
significantly different price estimates than does issuing a point forecast (one-sided 
p=0.140) when uncertainty is high.24  
 
Effects of Misalignment - Mediation Analyses 
I also make predictions about several mediation paths between the independent 
variables and dependent variables.  Specifically, as depicted in Figure 1, I predict that 
1) participants’ perceptions of management credibility will mediate the relationship 
between the independent variables (of environmental uncertainty and forecast 
precision) and growth expectations.  Next, because growth expectations factor into 
stock price estimates, I also expect that 2) growth expectations will act as a mediator 
between the independent variables and stock price estimates.  Further, given the 
overall path suggested by the above two mediations (i.e. independent variables → 
credibility perceptions → growth expectations → stock price estimates), I predict that: 
3) credibility should also mediate the relationship between the independent variables 
and stock price estimates and that 4) growth expectations should mediate the 
relationship   between  credibility  perceptions  and  stock  price  estimates.   Figure   3 
                                                 
24
 Simple effects may also be analyzed within each forecast precision setting.  Within the Point Forecast 
setting, PriceDifference estimates in the Low Uncertainty treatment are significantly higher than 
PriceDifference estimates in the High Uncertainty treatment (one-sided p-value=0.002); 
PriceDifference estimates in the Range Forecast setting are not significantly different across the two 
uncertainty levels (one-sided p-value =0.425).   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Overall Results 
 
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the results for and links between H1 through H3.  Solid lines represent significant 
relationships between model components, while a dotted line represents the lack of a significant relationship between two 
components; NS = Not significant. 
Misalignment between 
Forecast Precision and 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Perceptions of 
Management 
Credibility 
Future Firm 
Growth 
Expectations 
Stock Price 
Estimate 
Difference    
NS Regardless of Future 
Firm Growth 
Expectations 
H1: p = 0.018 
H2: p = 0.095 
 
(NS given Perceptions of 
Management Credibility) 
 H3: p = 0.039 
 
(marginally significant given                
Future Firm Growth 
Expectations) 
p = 0.019 
p = 0.038 
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summarizes the mediation analyses results described below. 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986) and Kenny, Kashy and Bolger (1998), 
four steps must be carried out to confirm mediation: 1) show that the independent 
variable is correlated with the dependent variable, 2) show that the independent 
variable is correlated with the mediator, 3) show that the mediator is correlated with 
the dependent variables, and 4) show that the relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variables becomes less significant when the mediator is 
included in the model. When applying these steps to the analysis of credibility as a 
mediator between misalignment and growth expectations, results of H2 satisfy the first 
step of the Baron and Kenny (1986) analysis, and results of H1 satisfy step 2.   Table 7 
reports results of steps 3 and 4.  Credibility perceptions and Growth expectations are 
significantly positively correlated (p=0.019) satisfying step 3.  Once Credibility is 
added as a covariate in the model testing H2, the Uncertainty x Precision interaction 
loses significance (p-value decreases from 0.095 to 0.232), satisfying step 4.  
Performing the Sobel test further confirms that perceptions of management credibility 
mediate the relationship between misalignment and investors’ perceptions of future 
firm growth (one-sided p=0.04).25   
Since future firm growth expectations factor into investors’ stock price 
estimates, I expect that these two dependent variables are significantly correlated, and 
more so, that growth expectations mediate the relationship between misalignment and 
stock price estimates.  Step 3 of Table 8 shows that Growth and PriceDifference are 
significantly positively correlated (p=0.038).  Further, remaining results presented in 
Table  8  support  the  prediction  that  growth  expectations  mediate  the  relationship 
                                                 
25
 The Sobel test is a one step test of whether a mediator carries the influence of an independent variable 
to a dependent variable with the advantage of displaying a significance level for the mediation of 
interest. Using Monte Carlo simulation MacKinnon, Warsi, and Dwyer (1995) show that the Sobel test 
and the Baron and Kenny (1986) analysis performed equally well in sample sizes of above 50.   
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TABLE 7: Test of Mediation for Credibility Perceptions 
 
Baron and Kenny (1986) steps with Growth as dependent variable: 
Step 1: satisfied via significance of H2 
Step 2: satisfied via significance of H1 
Step 3: Credibility and Growth perceptions significantly positively correlated 
 Correlation coefficient = 0.225 
 P-Value = 0.019 
 
Step 4: Effect of Misalignment on Growth becomes insignificant once include 
Credibility in the model 
 
Analysis of Covariance for Growth given ExperienceType and Credibility 
Source  DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
ExperienceType 1 0.871 0.297 0.297 0.36 0.548 
Credibility 1 4.615 3.701 3.701 4.52 0.036 
Uncertainty 1 0.346 0.267 0.267 0.33 0.569 
Precision  1 0.030 0.039 0.039 0.05 0.829 
Uncertainty*Precision  1 1.184 1.184 1.184 1.45 0.232 
Error  114 93.322 93.322 0.819   
Total             119  100.367        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 presents results of the Baron and Kenny (1986) steps for mediation, testing 
whether Credibility mediates the relationship between Misalignment and Growth 
expectations.   
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TABLE 8: Test of Mediation for Growth Expectations 
 
 
Baron and Kenny (1986) steps with PriceDifference as dependent variable: 
Step 1: satisfied via significance of H3 
Step 2: satisfied via significance of H2 
Step 3: Growth and PriceDifference perceptions significantly positively correlated  
 Correlation Coefficient= 0.101  
 P-value = 0.038 
 
Step 4: Effect of Misalignment on PriceDifference reduces from significant to 
marginally significant once include Growth in the model 
 
Analysis of Covariance for PriceDifference given ExperienceType and Growth 
Source  DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
ExperienceType 1 0.820 1.420 1.420 6.50 0.012 
Growth 1 1.014 0.747 0.747 3.42 0.067 
Uncertainty 1 1.297 1.319 1.319 6.04 0.016 
Precision  1 0.091 0.099 0.099 0.45 0.503 
Uncertainty*Precision  1 0.707 0.707 0.707 3.23 0.075 
Error  114 24.918 24.918 0.219   
Total             119   28.847        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of the strength of a relationship between 
Growth expectations and PriceDifference (where Price Difference = Post Treatment 
Price Estimate – Pre Treatment Price Estimate). Panel B presents results of the Baron 
and Kenny (1986) steps for mediation, testing whether Growth mediates the 
relationship between Misalignment and PriceDifference Estimates.   
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between  misalignment  and  PriceDifference  estimates  (as  adding  Growth  into  the  
model testing H3 – with PriceDifference as the dependent variable – decreases the 
interaction p-value from 0.039 to 0.075; Sobel test one-sided p=0.07).   
When applying the above steps to the analysis of credibility as a mediator 
between misalignment and stock price estimates, results of H3 satisfy the first step of 
the Baron and Kenny (1986) analysis, while results of H1 satisfy step 2.   However, 
performing step 3 results in a non-significant correlation coefficient of 0.003 
(p=0.956) suggesting that perceptions of management credibility cannot be a mediator 
for the relationship between misalignment and investors’ stock price estimates.   
Finding that perceptions of credibility mediate the relationship between 
misalignment and growth expectations (i.e. Table 7), and that growth expectations 
mediate the relationship between misalignment and stock price estimates, suggests an 
indirect relationship between management credibility and stock price estimates.  That 
is, perceptions of management credibility affect growth expectations which in turn 
affect stock price estimates.  Note however, that it is not possible for growth 
expectations to serve as a mediator between perceptions of credibility and price 
difference estimates, since the latter two judgments are not significantly correlated 
(p=0.956).   
 
Effects of Misalignment - Signaling Hypothesis 
Signaling theory suggests the possibility that investors will consider a point 
forecast issued in a highly uncertain environment as a signal of positive private 
information and thus increase their ratings of management credibility.    Given support 
for H1,   investors’ stock price estimates follow the pattern predicted by attribution 
theory rather than the predictions of signaling theory.  Therefore, considerations of 
management possessing positive private information cannot serve as a mediator 
  38
between misalignment and stock price estimates.  An insignificant association between 
PrivateInformation and PriceDifference (untabulated) supports the lack of mediation 
(p=0.163).  PrivateInformation also does not serve as a mediator between 
misalignment and growth expectations, since PrivateInformation and Growth are not 
significantly correlated (p=0.303).  Thus, although some portion of participants 
considered signaling by management, signaling considerations do not play a 
significant role in the model presented in Figure 1. 
Since it appears that some participants considered signaling effects while 
others responded to misalignment by adjusting their credibility perceptions and growth 
expectations, I rerun all of the above analyses while controlling for how strongly 
participant considerations of signaling affected their stock price estimates (i.e. 
including a self-report measure of Private Information Importance = Not at all 
Important in Estimating Price, Not Very Important in Estimating Price, Somewhat 
Important in Estimating Price, Very Important in Estimating Price).  Untabulated 
results suggest that the significance of H1, H3, and the credibility mediation analyses 
is not affected, but that the significance of H2 improves from p=0.095 to p=0.052, and 
that the significance of growth as a mediator between misalignment and stock price 
estimates improves from Sobel one-sided p=0.07 to p=0.050.   
 
Confidence in EPS Estimates 
H4 predicts that confidence in participants’ stock price estimates will be 
highest when environmental uncertainty is low and management discloses a point 
forecast, and lowest when environmental uncertainty is high and management 
discloses a range forecast.  This hypothesis is equivalent to two main effects of 
precision and uncertainty.   
The mean Confidence responses for each cell of the 2x2 design are provided in  
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TABLE 9: Test of H4 
 
PANEL A: Mean Confidence in Price Estimate 
 
  
  Environmental Uncertainty 
  
  Low High Overall 
Pr
ec
isi
o
n
 
Point 59.67% 43.33% 51.50% 
Range 62.67% 40.67% 51.67% 
Overall 61.17% 42.00%  
 
PANEL B: Analysis of Covariance for Confidence Estimates given  
Experience Type  
        
Source  DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
ExperienceType 1 0.223 0.041 0.041 0.01 0.929 
Uncertainty 1 110.142 109.795 109.795 21.65 <0.001 
Precision  1 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.00 0.974 
Uncertainty*Precision  1 2.298 2.298 2.298 0.45 0.502 
Error  115 583.326 583.326 5.072   
Total             119  695.992         
 
Panel A of Table 9 presents mean Confidence estimates.  Panel B presents the results 
of an ANCOVA with Confidence as the dependent variable, Environmental 
Uncertainty, Forecast Precision, and their interaction as the independent variables, and 
ExperienceType as a covariate.   
Panel A of Table 9 and suggest that Confidence ratings are high (low) when issuing a 
forecast in a low (high) uncertainty setting but do not differ across precision levels.    
ANCOVA results in Panel B of Table 9 confirm a significant main effect for 
uncertainty (p<0.001) but, contrary to prior forecast precision studies, no effect for 
precision (p=0.974).  H3 is only partially supported. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
Over the past two decades, earnings forecasts have become a major component 
of firms’ voluntary disclosures (Cotter et al. 2006).  Management uses earnings 
forecasts either to adjust market expectations regarding future firm performance 
(Ajinkya and Gift 1984) or simply to confirm that current expectations are accurate 
(Clement, Frankel, and Miller 2003).  While it is well-documented that the actual 
earnings prediction is value-relevant, little evidence exists to suggest that the precision 
of this prediction is also important.  My study contributes to the earnings forecast 
literature by 1) showing that forecast precision matters prior to earnings 
announcements, 2) identifying investors’ expectations as a reason why forecast 
precision matters, and 3) beginning to explain the process behind how forecast 
precision affects investors’ stock price estimates and perceptions of firm growth. 
Results indicate that the precision of management earnings forecasts and 
environmental uncertainty interact to affect investors’ assessments of management 
credibility, earnings growth, and stock price, with all of those assessments being lower 
when precision and uncertainty are misaligned. Specifically, given low (high) 
environmental uncertainty, stock price estimates are lower when management issues a 
misaligned range (point) earnings forecast than when management issues an aligned 
point (range) earnings forecast.  This result is in contrast to prior behavioral research, 
which does not find any effect for the precision of management forecasts on firm 
valuation estimates immediately following forecast issuance.   As a practical matter, 
this result suggests that a manager who wants to communicate good news and who 
desires that investors 1) view the manager as credible, 2) predict higher earnings 
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growth, and 3) estimate a higher stock price, should issue range forecasts when in a 
high uncertainty environment and point forecasts when in a low uncertainty 
environment. 
Examining the simple effects in a different direction, my results indicate a 
strong effect of environmental uncertainty on investors’ judgments when investors are 
provided a point forecast, but virtually no effect on any of investors’ judgments when 
they are provided a range forecast. Thus environmental uncertainty is more damaging 
to investors’ judgments given more precise forecast information, with investors 
rewarding a precise forecast under low uncertainty but penalizing a precise forecast 
under high uncertainty, relative to what investors would do when provided a range 
forecast.  This finding is consistent with post-earnings-announcement results in LTH 
where investor responses to guidance error following point forecasts were 
significantly more extreme than investor responses following wide range forecasts.  
Combining the results of both studies suggests that the market significantly rewards, 
but also significantly punishes firms issuing point forecasts rather than wide range 
forecasts.  Given the potential for such negative market reaction immediately after 
forecast issuance and following subsequent earnings announcement may explain the 
less prominent occurrence of point forecasts, rather than range forecasts, in firm 
earnings disclosures (e.g. see Baginski et al. 2007). 
I expected that perceptions of management credibility would mediate the effect 
of misalignment on growth expectations and stock price.  However, perceptions of 
management credibility only mediate the relationship between misalignment and 
growth expectations, and not the relationship between misalignment and stock price 
estimates.  A potential explanation for this unexpected result lies in the components of 
stock price estimates.  That is, stock price estimates can be viewed as a product of EPS 
and P/E multiple expectations.  Prior credibility research has only found a link 
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between perceptions of credibility and P/E multiple estimates (also supported by the 
current study if we assume that perceptions of growth proxy for P/E multiple 
estimates), but no relationship between credibility and EPS estimates (Barton and 
Mercer 2005; Hirst, Koonce, Venkatarman 2007).  Combining both EPS and P/E 
multiple expectations into one stock price estimate may therefore lessen the strength 
with which management credibility mediates misalignment and stock price 
estimates.26  Further, there may not be enough variation in credibility perceptions to 
drive investor stock price estimates. However, together with a significant effect of 
misalignment on perceptions of credibility (i.e. results for H1), the lack of a 
relationship between credibility and stock price estimates suggests that misalignment 
between environmental uncertainty and forecast precision should be of considerable 
concern to management.  That is, misalignment lowers investors’ perceptions of 
management credibility as well as, and apart from, investors’ valuation of the firm’s 
stock price.   
My results also suggest that expectation about environmental uncertainty 
significantly affect investors’ confidence in their stock price estimates, but results do 
not confirm prior findings of the effect of forecast precision on investors’ confidence 
in their estimates.  A potential explanation for the lack of a main effect for earnings 
forecast precision is the difference in dependent variables between my study and prior 
studies.  Hirst et al. (1999) and LTH each elicit EPS estimates – the same types of 
estimates provided by management in an earnings forecast.  It is then reasonable for an 
investor making an EPS estimate to find the precision level of the same EPS estimate 
provided by management to be very informative.  My study elicits stock price 
estimates which, while informed by firm EPS forecasts, also encompass other and 
                                                 
26
 Pilot testing of the current study suggests that when EPS estimates are elicited instead of stock price 
estimates, perceptions of management credibility do not mediate the relationship between misalignment 
and EPS estimates. 
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more forward looking performance indicators.  It is therefore understandable that the 
precision of one indicator carries less weight in determining confidence in the overall 
stock price estimate.27 
My results are subject to several limitations.  First, due to time constraints, 
participants’ task is a simplification of the financial statement analysis task that would 
be required to provide firm stock price estimates.  Participants are asked to assume 
that they have already completed a majority of their analysis prior to encountering the 
earnings forecast that is the focus of my experiment.  Although this assumption affects 
the realism of my design, it should not impact the direction of participant responses.  
Second, the study was administered online rather than in person.  Although allowing 
participants to access the study independently at any point during a pre-specified 
period of time inherently surrenders some experimental control in administering the 
study, the potential increased variability in responses should work against obtaining 
predicted results.  Further, prior convergent validity research in accounting has shown 
no significant differences in the results of in-lab and out-of-lab experiments 
(Alexander, Blay, and Hurtt 2006). 
                                                 
27
 Pilot testing of the current study suggests that when EPS estimates are elicited instead of stock price 
estimates, both a main effect for uncertainty and a main effect for precision are significant (p<0.001 for 
each). 
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APPENDIX  
PILOT EXPERIMENT 
Hypotheses 
Pilot Experiment hypotheses were similar to the hypotheses described in 
Chapter 2 with two main exceptions.  First, in contrast to the dependent variables that 
are the focus of H2 and H3, in the pilot study I elicit forecasts of Earnings per Share 
(EPS).  Therefore, I also elicit participant assessments of confidence in their EPS 
forecasts as opposed to their stock price estimates. Second, I focus on the components 
of management credibility (i.e. competence and trustworthiness) and predict that the 
relative impact of each component will be different depending on the experimental 
treatment.  Below I explain these two exceptions in more detail. 
Hypothesis 1 does not vary across the pilot and primary experiments. 
Pilot H1:  Perceptions of management credibility are lower when expectations 
about environmental uncertainty and precision of positive news 
forecasts do not align than when they align. 
However, the main measure of investor and analyst behavior in forecast 
precision studies has been an EPS forecast.  Extending those studies, I predict that 
EPS forecasts will follow the same pattern as do perceptions of management 
credibility, being less favorable when environmental uncertainty and forecast 
precision do not align than when they align. 
Pilot H2: EPS forecasts are lower when expectations about environmental  
uncertainty and precision of positive news forecasts do not align  
than when they align. 
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Eliciting EPS forecasts also slightly alters the focus of my confidence-in-
estimates hypothesis, as I ask participants to assess the confidence in their EPS 
forecasts. 
Pilot H3: Investors’ confidence in their EPS forecasts is highest (lowest) in  
response to point (range) earnings forecasts evaluated with an  
expectation of low (high) environmental uncertainty. 
I also rely on prior literature to make predictions regarding specific investor 
perceptions of management competence and trustworthiness.  Specifically, the 
negative inferences that investors make about management credibility may depend on 
the particular misalignment between expected and actual forecast precision.  Prior 
psychology research has established that two main components of source credibility 
are competence and trustworthiness (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953, Griffin 1967).   
Consider the misalignment scenario in which management discloses a positive 
earnings forecast that is precise but investors perceive high uncertainty in the firm’s 
environment.  This misalignment is likely to lead investors to question why the 
forecast is so precise.  Attribution theory predicts that investors will answer this 
question with attributions to management character.  Yet it seems less likely that 
investors will view management as untrustworthy, since the accuracy of a precise 
forecast can be clearly verified once management makes the actual earnings 
announcement several weeks later.  If management did issue a dishonest forecast, the 
effect of the forecast would only be temporary and management would be severely 
punished once the forecast was revealed as inaccurate.  Therefore, in this setting it is 
more probable that investors will perceive the manager as less competent and 
overzealous in the precision of his estimates.28 
                                                 
28
 Another possibility when managers make overly precise forecasts in an uncertain environment is that 
they are capable of managing their earnings to achieve the precise forecast (see, e.g., Nelson, Elliott, 
and Tarpley 2002).  In the pilot experiment I limit this possible inference by informing participants that 
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Pilot H4: When investors perceive high environmental uncertainty but  
management discloses a precise forecast, lower perceptions of  
management credibility occur mainly through investor perceptions  
of management competence. 
Now consider the second misalignment scenario in which management 
discloses a positive earnings forecast that is imprecise but investors perceive low 
uncertainty in the firm’s environment.  This misalignment is likely to lead investors to 
question why the forecast is not more precise.  The low level of uncertainty in the 
environment dictates that a precise forecast should not be difficult to estimate.  Since 
investors perceive relative ease in generating an earnings estimate, inability to provide 
a precise forecast due to lack of management competence is unlikely to be their main 
inference.  Instead, managers appear evasive.  Because an imprecise forecast allows 
management to disguise a not so positive prediction among a range of higher potential 
estimates and because management has a very strong incentive to suggest that the firm 
will perform better in the future, investors are more likely to infer that the cause of 
misalignment between their expectations and actual forecast precision is a 
shortcoming in management trustworthiness.  
Pilot H5: When investors perceive low environmental uncertainty but 
management discloses an imprecise forecast, lower perceptions of 
management credibility occur mainly through investor perceptions 
of management trustworthiness. 
Psychology research suggests an asymmetry in the extent to which negative 
attributions to competence and negative attributions to trustworthiness lead to lower 
perceptions of management credibility.  Reeder and Brewer (1979) lay out a model 
                                                                                                                                            
the target firm maintains low and consistent accrual levels through the years.  A useful direction for 
future research is to consider whether forecast precision can interact with expectations in some 
circumstances to suggest an intention to manage earnings. 
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which predicts that displays of low integrity (i.e., trustworthiness) are more 
informative than displays of low competence, because while highly competent 
individuals do sometimes make mistakes, highly trustworthy persons never perform 
acts of low integrity.  As a result, attributing a misalignment to low management 
trustworthiness may have more negative consequences than attributing the 
misalignment to low management competence: 
Pilot H6: Investors’ perceptions of management credibility are lower when  
investors perceive low environmental uncertainty but management  
discloses an imprecise forecast than when investors perceive high  
environmental uncertainty but management discloses a precise  
forecast. 
 
Design 
I use a 2x2 between subjects design where I manipulate forecast precision 
(point vs. range) and the level of uncertainty in the environment (low vs. high).  After 
viewing firm background information and experimental manipulations all participants 
assess management competence and trustworthiness, provide their EPS estimates, and 
rate their confidence in those EPS estimates. 
 
Results 
I find partial support for Pilot H1, such that, within a low environmental 
uncertainty setting, perceptions of management credibility are lower given 
misalignment (i.e. management issues a range forecast) than given alignment (i.e. 
management issues a point forecasts) between forecast precision and environmental 
uncertainty.  However, I do not find significant differences between the point and 
range scenarios given high environmental uncertainty. 
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In line with predictions in Pilot H2, within each environmental uncertainty 
setting EPS estimates are lower given misalignment between forecast precision and 
environmental uncertainty than given alignment.  Findings do not, however, confirm 
that perceptions of management credibility mediate the relationship between 
misalignment and EPS estimates. 
Results support the predictions in Pilot H3, such that, investors’ EPS forecast 
confidence ratings are highest (lowest) in response to point (range) earnings forecasts 
evaluated with an expectation of low (high) environmental uncertainty.  Results do not 
support the predictions in Pilot H4-H6. 
 
Adjustments Made Prior to Primary Experiment 
Given findings from the pilot experiment, I make two main adjustments to the 
primary experiment: 1) I fine tune my measure of management credibility, and do not 
attempt to test differential importance of various aspects of management credibility, 
and 2) I replace EPS forecasts with growth expectations and stock price estimates as 
the main dependent variables of interest. 
I attribute the lack of an effect of misalignment on perceptions of management 
credibility in the high environmental uncertainty setting to a measurement problem.  
As a result, in the primary experiment I fine tune the credibility measure to more 
clearly focus on internal attributions about management credibility as opposed to 
management and disclosure credibility.  First, I remove reference to ‘financial 
disclosures’ from both the competence and trustworthiness questions.  Second, I 
remind participants to answer these questions keeping in mind their specific forecast 
precision and environmental uncertainty scenario as follows: 
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Trustworthiness measure: “Given Zetha’s highly certain [uncertain] 
operating environment and management’s point [range] earnings forecast, 
I trust Zetha’s management.”  
Competence measure: “Given Zetha’s highly certain [uncertain] operating 
environment and management’s point [range] earnings forecast, Zetha's 
management is competent.”   
I do not attempt to test pilot H4-H6, as I do not believe my credibility measure 
is powerful enough to identify the subtle effects indicated in those hypotheses. 
Management credibility research focuses on the price to earnings (P/E) 
multiple as the main dependent variable affected by perceptions of management 
credibility. Further, some research argues that management credibility is conceptually 
more tightly linked to P/E multiples than EPS estimates (e.g. Barton and Mercer 
2005).  Therefore, in the primary experiment, I rely on this literature when eliciting 
participant future growth expectations (where growth is a major component of a P/E 
multiple).  Additionally, I combine the main dependent variable used in precision 
research (i.e. EPS forecasts) with the main dependent variable used in credibility 
research (i.e. P/E multiples) by asking participants to estimate the firm’s price per 
share (where price per share = EPS * P/E multiple).   The price per share estimate also 
allows me to more directly test for an economic impact of precision and uncertainty.   
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